

OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

COMMENTS

on the

DULLES COMMITTEE REPORT TO THE  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
ON THE  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
AND  
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR INTELLIGENCE

*Final  
Draft  
RPS*

## I. General Statement (cont.)

### 1. The Objectives of ORE in Reviewing the Dulles Report

In reviewing the Dulles Report, the Office of Reports and Estimates has as its basic objective, not self-justification or the denial of admitted shortcomings, but a genuinely constructive effort to shed the light of practical working experience upon the problem of improving the production of ~~that national~~ intelligence upon which United States policy should be based.

ORE has, therefore, proceeded to examine the recommendations contained in the Dulles Report, has pointed out certain impractical aspects, and has indicated how the recommendations might be most effectively implemented. ORE considers that its intimate acquaintance with the actual problems involved in the production of national intelligence enable it, with the help of the ~~admirably~~ detached perspective of the Dulles Report, to suggest concrete means for carrying out the principles underlying the Report.

### 2. ORE Reaction to the Report as a Whole

~~ORE considers~~ the Dulles Report as an admirable effort to re-direct CIA to fundamentals and first principles in the production of national intelligence; and proposes in effect a return to the concepts developed at the close of the war during two years of earnest and intense discussion among the most experienced intelligence personnel in Washington. The observations of the Committee appear accurate; its objectives are sound; but its conclusions are in many respects faulty, and the recommendations for their attainment are in many cases impracticable.

Although the proposals bearing on this Office lack, perhaps by intent, both precision and detail, ORE believes that sound administration of the suggested organization, combined with strong NSC direction to the IAC agencies to make their facilities available to CIA, ~~can bring~~ <sup>could</sup> about improved intelligence production.

The Report's greatest weakness stems from the Committee's restricted concept of the extent to which the departmental intelligence activities needed to be investigated in order to appraise their ~~relationship to~~ <sup>relationship to</sup> ~~cumulative effect~~ on the operations of CIA. Although the Committee claimed to appreciate the danger of considering CIA activities alone and frankly stated that some correctives were needed outside CIA, specific recommendations were addressed only to CIA and an indefensible share of responsibility for CIA's admitted shortcomings was attributed to the Director. The resulting Report contains many acute observations but it also embodies recommendations which could not by themselves bring about the desired results.

3.

SUMMARY OF ORE RECOMMENDATIONS

On the basis of its ~~review~~ <sup>detailed comments (to be found in Sec II)</sup> of the conclusions and recommendations of the Dulles Report, ORE ~~makes~~ <sup>recommends</sup> the following ~~summary recommendations~~ <sup>recommendations</sup> ~~these principles and objectives with which it agrees~~

(1) NSCID #1 and NSCID #3 should be revised to:

- (a) redefine CIA's intelligence production responsibilities as set forth in Section II, paragraph 1 b;
- (b) define those intelligence categories, in fields of common interest, which should be produced centrally by CIA;
- (c) clarify and define departmental intelligence responsibilities to CIA;
- (d) require departmental intelligence agencies to grant priority to the production of intelligence required by CIA; and
- (e) clarify IAC coordination procedures on CIA estimates as recommended in Section II, paragraph 4.

(2) Reorganization of ORE may be required to provide for the production of national intelligence estimates, as distinguished from central research in intelligence fields of common concern. Such reorganization should not ~~be~~ be attempted, however, until the action in paragraph (1) above has been completed. ORE should not be divided into two separate CIA Offices for the purpose of separating the two types of intelligence production unless the need for such action is proved and demonstrated.

(3) ORE agrees that ICAPS should be responsible solely to CIA and

not to the departmental agencies its members are supposed to represent. It strongly recommends, however, that ICAPS should not be reconstituted along the lines suggested in the Report, but should be replaced by a working staff acting for a Council, composed of the D/CI and his Assistant Directors, and established to deal with intelligence problems of concern to two or more offices of CIA. The Assistant Directors concerned should attend all meetings of the IAC standing committee.

(4) ORE has no desire to operate the CIA Library nor to assume the functions of the Foreign Documents Branch, as long as such services continue to be conducted in support of ORE. It is recommended, therefore, that these two functions remain where they are or be merged as a library service within OCD.

(5) ORE regards as one of its major responsibilities the furnishing of specific and long-range guidance to OO and OSO collection facilities, through the development of coordinated interdepartmental requirements for information. It recommends that this function should not be decentralized to OO and OSO.

(6) ORE direct working-level relations with NSC, JCS, and the State Department Policy Planning Staff should be authorized in order (a) to receive the guidance necessary for its production effort, and (b) to give more direct and effective intelligence support to policy and operational levels.

*(enable ORE to)*

II. ORE COMMENTS ON SPECIFIC DULLES REPORT CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION - CHAPTER V (1)

In the Central Intelligence Agency there has been confusion  
between the responsibility of producing coordinated national  
intelligence estimates and responsibility for miscellaneous  
research and reporting activities.

CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION - CHAPTER VI (4)

The various reports, studies and summaries which are not  
national intelligence or recognized services of common concern  
should be discontinued.

a. These two points have been considered together as they are part of the same problem.

b. ORE believes that what the Dulles Committee describes as "confusion" has resulted from CIA's recognition of its threefold responsibilities as the producer of national estimates, as the intelligence facility of the NSC, and as the agency responsible for performing services of common concern. The Committee has failed to recognize the gap that exists between CIA's explicit responsibilities, as set forth in NSCID #3, and CIA's implicit responsibilities as the intelligence facility of the NSC. Moreover, NSCID #3 is rigid with respect to CIA's production responsibilities and so flexible with respect to those of the departmental intelligence agencies ~~that it is rendered~~ <sup>is seriously impaired</sup> ~~as to be practically useless~~ as a working document. The Committee's conclusion is made on the basis of a dangerously limited view of CIA's responsibility for intelligence production. Such responsibilities should be considered not solely ----->

in terms of the production of "coordinated national intelligence estimates" and "intelligence in fields of common interest" but also in terms of CIA's role as the intelligence facility of the President, the National Security Council and such agencies as may be designated by them.

¶. CIA intelligence production responsibilities should include the following, and NSCID #1 and NSCID #3 should be modified accordingly to include a revised and more appropriate definition of national intelligence: //

- (1) To produce intelligence required to reduce to the minimum ~~practicable limits~~, the element of surprise in foreign situations and developments which affect U. S. national security.
- (2) To produce coordinated intelligence estimates required for national planning, policy and operational decisions.
- (3) To produce intelligence required to support those agencies designated by the NSC to receive it.
- (4) To produce intelligence in fields of common interest to CIA and the departmental intelligence agencies, including economic and scientific intelligence.
- (5) To produce intelligence required for CIA estimates not normal to any departmental responsibilities.

¶. It should be noted that paragraph ¶ (2) above is the only category of intelligence which conforms to the definition of national intelligence in NSCID #3.

for T.B.

## 2. CONCLUSION &amp; RECOMMENDATION - CHAPTER V (2)

The provisions of the National Security Act for the production of national intelligence estimates, as interpreted by the National Security Council Intelligence Directives, are sound but have not been effectively carried out.

a. ORE concurs in the assertion that the provisions of the National Security Act for the production of national intelligence estimates are sound, but does not concur in the statement that these provisions are adequately interpreted ~~by~~ the NSCID's, ~~with~~ particularly in ~~reference to~~ NSCID #1 and NSCID #3.

b. ORE has taken this position for reasons cited in paragraph 1 b and c above, and for the following additional reasons:

(1) The directives do not provide for adequate treatment of the matter of priority within the departmental intelligence agencies with respect to their support of CIA. Consequently, CIA is unable to make optimum use of departmental intelligence ~~as present directives require~~ and cannot depend upon timely departmental action in meeting CIA commitments and deadlines.

(2) *The directives* ~~They~~ do not adequately allocate production responsibilities, ~~and do not~~ define intelligence fields of common concern.

(3) The present policy governing IAC coordination of CIA Estimates in the directives is inadequate for the purpose. (Ref para. 4 below.)

For T.B.

3. CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION - CHAPTER V (3)

There should be created in the Central Intelligence Agency a small Estimates Division which would draw upon and review the specialized intelligence product of the departmental agencies in order to prepare coordinated national intelligence estimates.

CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION - CHAPTER VI (1).

In addition to the Estimates Division recommended in the previous Chapter, there should be created out of the present Office of Reports and Estimates a Research and Reports Division to accomplish central research in, and coordinated production of, intelligence in fields of common interest. The staff of this Division should include sufficient representation from the State Department and the Services to insure that their needs are adequately met.

a. These two recommendations have been considered together inasmuch as they are part of the same problem.

~~It is presently doing intelligence research to support its production of estimates and in fields of common concern, such as economic and map intelligence.~~

~~Partially because the Report is vague concerning the details.~~  
b. In ORE, opinion is divided on the question of the necessity or desirability of a drastic internal ~~reorganization~~ reorganization now. ~~However, if~~ the Committee's recommendation means that the Estimates Division is to be ~~sufficiently~~ <sup>enough</sup> larger to provide its own relatively high level research support, the recommendation is workable and might result in simplification of the process of producing estimates. Similarly, the proposed

~~the including of basic~~  
Research and Reports Division, oriented primarily toward economic  
~~and as well as~~ research and to which would be attached the present Map Branch and  
such other facilities as might be determined to belong there, ~~might~~ <sup>could</sup>  
profitably operate apart from the Estimates Division. It ~~should~~ <sup>must</sup> be  
pointed out, however, that these recommendations are made within the  
framework of the ~~entire Report and that~~ It would therefore be highly  
inadvisable to ~~carry out such a division of the present ORE functions~~  
~~separate the~~ without making sure that corresponding changes in the functions and  
facilities of the departmental intelligence agencies, particularly  
in their relationships to CIA, ~~will be brought about~~. It should also  
be recognized that decentralization of intelligence production res-  
ponsibilities, as recommended in the Report, ~~necessarily involve~~ <sup>with</sup> substantial  
problems of coordination, flow, routing, and priorities of access to  
source materials ~~and raise the~~ <sup>on an even greater</sup> potential danger of duplication of effort ~~than now exists~~.

d. ORE believes therefore that these recommendations are ~~pre-~~  
~~mature, and should be seriously considered only after NSCID #1 and~~  
~~the implementation of revised~~  
~~have been revised~~ <sup>the promulgation of revised</sup>  
NSCID #3 and the effect reviewed.

*Attachment*

4. CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION - CHAPTER V (4)

Under the leadership of the Director of Central Intelligence,  
these estimates should be submitted for discussion and approval  
by the reconstituted Intelligence Advisory Committee whose mem-  
bers should assume collective responsibility for them.

CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION - CHAPTER V (5)

Provision should be made in these arrangements for the handling  
of crisis situations when coordinated estimates are required  
without delay.

CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION - CHAPTER V (6)

Coordinated intelligence estimates produced in this way must, in  
order to be effective, be recognized as the most authoritative  
estimates available to the policy makers.

a. These three recommendations have been considered together as  
parts of the same problem.

b. ORE cannot agree with the view that members of the IAC should  
assume collective responsibility for CIA estimates. It is considered  
that the main question is what sort of estimate should emerge from the  
*structured*  
~~intelligence organizations~~. Those who developed the original concept  
of a central intelligence group had clearly in mind the ever-present  
factor of departmental bias as well as the shortcomings of joint in-

*elligence, which often produces estimates so watered down in the process*  
*of reaching*  
~~such full~~  
*to achieve agreement as to be valueless. CIA estimates can be free from*  
*these things only if they are produced with full cognizance of depart-*  
*mental views but without subservience to departmental prejudices. Re-*  
*view* ~~in~~ *of CIA drafts intended to eliminate minor or apparent*  
*shared undertake*  
*IAC*

differences but not to gloss over divergences of informed opinion. The resultant estimate ~~should~~ must be essentially that of CIA and not that of the IAC collectively. ~~Not~~ ~~any~~ ~~should~~ any statements of ~~should~~ dissent be limited to substantial and well-defined issues, as the ~~Moreover, these directives~~ directives now provide, ~~but~~ ~~the~~ later should be further modified to restrict dissent to the field of responsibility of the dissenting agency.

(For example, ONI has an interest in political matters but is not responsible for estimates in that field, and CIA should not be required to publish a dissent by ONI on purely political matters if OIR concurs in the CIA position.) The logic of ORE's contention is simply that, just as a dissenting member of the IAC cannot be expected to share in the responsibility for ~~that estimate~~ <sup>CIA</sup> in which he dissents, so, by extension, even where IAC concurrence is complete, ~~the responsibility~~ <sup>CIA has sole</sup> ~~for its estimate,~~ ~~CIA alone, as the agency which produced the estimate, and is not~~ ~~the responsibility~~ ~~shared~~ collectively by the members of the IAC. Concurrence should fortify the estimate; it should not create an artificial responsibility. The Dulles Report does not reflect a clear understanding of this vital aspect of the coordination theory. To <sup>The Committee</sup> ~~its authors~~, "national" intelligence is merely "coordinated" intelligence, and coordinated intelligence is joint intelligence, at the mercy of departmental bias. ~~CIA should be required, as at present, to submit its estimates to the IAC for review. The several IAC members should be in turn responsible for making known to CIA their views on those parts of the estimate which deal with matters within their~~

*the*  
c. Although the Report favors ~~a~~ method of preparing drafts in an ad hoc committee, the experience of ORE (including the example of "Project 50", cited by the Committee), shows that this procedure is time-consuming and inefficient. ORE believes that coordination procedures will be effective only if its own estimates personnel produce the initial draft as a basis for discussion with a permanent, full-time, substantively competent IAC committee, prior to the submittal of the estimates to the Director for IAC action.

d. ORE agrees that there must be effective means for handling crisis situations. In the light of past experience, some modification of the present DCI 3/1 procedures may now be necessary.

e. ORE believes that its estimates must earn their distinction as the most authoritative intelligence available to the policy-makers. It is, however, recommended that the NSC enjoin the policy makers ~~to utilize CIA intelligence when faced with policy decisions, and in~~  
*To* ~~to~~ give CIA such guidance in matters pertaining to national policy that CIA intelligence support will be more directly responsive to their needs.

respective fields of responsibility (as distinguished from fields of interest). Having considered these views and having given them effect where it deems it wise to do so, CIA must assume final responsibility for the estimate.

4. <



5. CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION - CHAPTER VI (2)

The Coordination Division (reconstituted Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff) should be given the responsibility for studying the actual scope of the Research and Reports Division and for recommending those services of common concern which should be performed centrally.

(a revised draft of NSC ID #3 should determine the)

a. ORE believes that the actual scope of intelligence production in fields of common concern should be included in the revised draft of NSC ID #3 after negotiation with the IAC Standing Committee. It is recommended that ORE be given this responsibility in collaboration with the IAC Standing Committee, for re-drafting NSC ID # 3 for these purposes.

b. Further comments on the ORE concept of the reconstituted ICAPS function are included in 7 below.

*Chap. VI*

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) In addition to the Estimates Division recommended in the previous Chapter, there should be created out of the present Office of Reports and Estimates a Research and Reports Division to accomplish central research in, and coordinated production of, intelligence in fields of common interest. The staff of this Division should include sufficient representation from the State Department and the Services to insure that their needs are adequately met.

(2) The Coordination Division (reconstituted Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff) should be given the responsibility for studying the actual scope of the Research and Reports Division and for recommending those services of common concern which should be performed centrally.

(3) The propriety of the preparation by the Central Intelligence Agency of essentially political summaries should be reviewed, taking into consideration the need for such summaries, the existence of a number of duplicating summaries and the particular capabilities of the individual departments to prepare them.

(4) The various reports, studies and summaries which are not national intelligence or recognized services of common concern should be discontinued.

*Part of (4)*

*100-616*

~~Recommendation (Not copy, Dulles Recomend)~~

( Chap VI (3))

6. a.

ORE does not concur in this recommendation or its implications.

In referring to CIA current intelligence publications as "essentially political summaries," the Report properly indicates that those publications are based to a considerable degree on State Department materials. However, a major cause for this preponderance of State Department materials is that Army and Navy do not, as State does, make their highest level intelligence and operational materials available to CIA. A strong NSC directive is required to remedy this situation. Concerning the problem of duplication, ORE believes that such duplication is more apparent than real. Each of the departmental agencies produces periodic summaries which are designed for a specific audience, and no one of those publications could meet the needs of the other audiences. (Even the State Department summaries are specialized; they are diplomatic summaries for readers with an intimate knowledge of diplomatic operations.) CIA current intelligence publications are the only ones designed primarily for the President and the NSC. ORE believes that only CIA has the perspective and the freedom from bias necessary for proper performance of this delicate and significant function.

6. b. The President and the members of the NSC have repeatedly expressed their approval of the CIA Daily and Weekly Summaries. Although the Report makes no specific recommendation concerning the CIA monthly "World Situation" Review, the publication has been well received, insofar as ORE has been able to ascertain.

7. CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION - CHAPTER IV (7)

The ICAPS should be reconstituted as a staff responsible only  
to the Director of Central Intelligence with the task of developing  
plans for the coordination of intelligence activities.

a. ORE ~~concurs~~ <sup>agrees</sup> that ICAPS should be replaced and reconstituted as

a CIA ~~entity~~

or <sup>RP</sup> in the recommendation  
ORE does not concur, that in its reconstituted form ICAPS or  
the proposed "Coordination Division" should function as recommended  
in the report. ORE recommends that ~~in lieu of~~ ICAPS ~~the D/CI should~~ <sup>be replaced</sup>  
establish a council of his Assistant Directors which will advise ~~him~~ <sup>the Director</sup>  
of intelligence policy and  
on matters requiring interdepartmental coordination, and which will  
prepare drafts of NSCID's and D/CI's to implement such proposals.

c. The council of Assistant Directors under the ORE proposal  
would require a Secretariat to formulate agenda, circulate drafts  
of papers, arrange and schedule meetings, record conclusions reached  
and cause approved plans, policies and directives to be promulgated.

d. The council of Assistant Directors under this proposal would  
in whole or in part, cause to convene and attend all IAC Standing  
Committee meetings.

Under this proposal,

the DCI would be represented on the IAC  
Planning Committee by the AD or ADs ~~dealing~~  
concerned with the problems appropriate  
under discussion.

8.  
10.

CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION - CHAPTER IV (8)

The responsibilities of the OCD with respect to the coordination of collection requirements and requests and the dissemination of intelligence should be carried out under the new Coordination Division. This is subject to future determination of the extent to which individual offices may conduct their own dissemination.

a. ORE does not agree that the OCD function is appropriate in any sense to its concept of the working staff function recommended for the reconstituted ICAPS in paragraph 9 above.

q

**N. CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION - CHAPTER VII (4)**

The Foreign Documents Branch should be made part of the

proposed Research and Reports Division if one is created.

*she opposes*  
~~s. ORE is consenting on this recommendation insofar as it applies to the principle of placing FDB integral with an intelligence production center.~~

*Because*  
~~Because~~ ~~the FDB function~~ *is basically* ~~is being~~ a "source exploitation facility", involving a substantial library and reference function, ~~ORE considers that FDB should remain in OOC~~ It should therefore remain where it is or be attached to the CIA Library. *The library should in turn*

~~The CIA Library and the Washington Collection function in the implementation of governmental holdings of actual and potential intelligence data~~ *in turn* ~~are inseparable and should remain in OCD as a central service to all CIA components.~~

10. CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION - CHAPTER XI (5)

There should be effective coordination between the work of  
the JIC in the field of military estimates and that of the  
CIA and IAC in the field of national estimates.

a. ORE believes that ~~effective coordination of matters of~~ intelligence production can be ~~effectively coordinated only~~ ~~accomplished directly at the working level and by representation from ORE not only to JIC but the NSC~~ ~~to the NSC as well as the JIC~~ ~~as well is necessary.~~

b. It is strongly recommended, therefore, that the ~~ORE~~ have the responsibility ~~for~~ conducting working-level liaison on substantive intelligence matters with NSC and JIC.

11. CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION - CHAPTER XII (1)

The State Department, to which the NSC has assigned dominant interest in the collection and production of political, cultural and sociological intelligence, should equip itself more adequately to meet the legitimate requirements of the CIA and of other Governmental intelligence agencies for such intelligence.

CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION - CHAPTER XII (2)

The specialized intelligence staff in the State Department, the Research and Intelligence Staff, does not now have sufficient current knowledge of departmental operations and policies to furnish, on behalf of the Department, the basic estimates which may be required by the CIA and the Service intelligence agencies.

a. These two conclusions and recommendations have been considered together as being separate parts of the same problem.

b. ORE concurs in each statement. (1) As long as the intelligence facilities of the Department of State are inadequate to meet CIA deadlines and CIA specifications for intelligence production, CIA has no alternative but to produce its own political, cultural and sociological intelligence. (2) As long as OIR is denied access to needed information which is available in the Department, ORE cannot risk the assumption that OIR intelligence production is complete and accurate.

12. CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION - CHAPTER XIII (3)

The liaison between the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency should be closer and put on a continuing, effective basis.

a. ORE concurs. Authorization should be granted ORE to maintain effective liaison with political and operational levels in the Department of State in addition to the liaison presently authorized with OIR. It is particularly important that ORE have effective working relations with the Department's Policy Planning Staff in order to coordinate intelligence production requirements. ORE intelligence production plans should be in phase with the policy planning of the Department. The present arrangement, authorizing ORE to deal only with the Office of Special Assistant for Intelligence, prevents CIA from receiving guidance from the State Department policy level.